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Abstract 
Individual behavior will be different at uncertain conditions, this study is to identify the social behavior 
change of children while they play a cooperative and competitive game. An evolutionary game named 
Strike up was developed for the study which involves the players to practice advance arithmetic through 
five card number calculations and strategies. A case study method is employed, during the game, 
participants’ dialogues were video-taped and its content was later analyzed and interpreted by 
triangulation. The results of this study suggest that (1) at the beginning, individualistic behavior displayed 
frequently in the boys’ team and dominating behavior was displayed at the final stage in the boys’ team. 
(2) female players tended to express more egalitarian behavior than altruistic, dominating, or 
individualistic behavior at the beginning. In addition, female players were more willing to altruistically 
help other comparing to the male players at the final stage.  
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of The Association 
Science Education and Technology 
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Introduction 
People are naturally motivated to pursue self-interest, but cooperate readily when self-interest coincides 
with collective interest. Some people may be tempted to free-ride on the cooperation of others, and hence 
profit from cooperative benefits without contributing. Such opportunistic behavior may easily undermine 
the effectiveness of cooperative action, and poses a challenge to evolutionary of cooperative behavior, 
especially in exchange situations where one has the choice between a self-interested strategy versus a 
strategy that benefits the whole group, but at a personal cost. This cooperation dilemma has sparked 
researchers in many scientific domains to pool their efforts in order to understand why costly prosocial 
behavior persists despite the high levels of uncertainty intrinsic to many social exchanges. Hence this 
research stresses the importance of extrinsic incentives that align self- and collective interest prompting 
people to act prosocially to reap personal benefits from cooperative interactions (e.g., Bornstein, 2003). 
Games offer highly promising learning opportunities because in many computer games, game play 
teaches players lessons that can be applied to other aspects of their life (Hamalainen, Manninen, Jarvela, 
& Hakkiner, 2006). Researchers have developed a series of different games, such as the ultimatum game, 
the trust game, the dictator game, and the Prisoner's dilemma, to investigate choices and decision making 
in social interactions and negotiations. Previous research investigates novel forms of interaction to 
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encourage collaboration, and techniques of gathering user for designing educational games (Bekker et al., 
2003). In brief, game play is one kind of social learning (Bandura, 1986), in playing the game, social 
behavior can be changed along with the interaction increased. 
A great deal of games children play generally influences social behavior (Green & Rechis, 2006). In 
game playing, individuals who attribute others’ actions as hostile (rather than benign) tend to react with 
blame and anger when they are hurt (de Castro et al., 2002). That is, during the game process, players 
would mutually help or display hostile behaviors to sustain their enjoyment during play. Moreover, if 
they show appreciation or apology even mutual helps with others, the game would continue longer 
(Kendall, 1993). In the sense, to improve players’ performance, games should be developed in a 
community of caring through cooperative learning (Donohue, Perry, & Weinstein, 2003), and sometimes 
generate hurting in the competitive situation.  
This study developed a game which composites complex arithmetic practice to examine the interaction 
patterns in a cooperative and competitive climate. In terms of the purpose, this study is to identify the 
types of social behavior change in children during mathematical game play, which involve cooperative 
and competitive contest.  
Research Contents and Questions 
Research suggests that classroom environments may influence child behavior (Donohue, Perry, & 
Weinstein, 2003). Both antisocial behavior and prosaically behavior alike have important implications for 
social and school-related adjustments of children (Frey, Nolen, Edstrom & Hirschsten, 2005). In game 
playing, players interact and learn how to take-turns, share resources, display feelings, take another's 
perspective , and, perhaps most importantly, manage conflicts (Parker et al., 1995; Rubin et al., 1998). 
Thus, social cognition changes appear to play an essential motivational role in game playing behaviors 
(Frey et al., 2005; Green & Rechis, 2006). 
Social behavior change in a game 
Social Exchange Theory postulates that social behavior is about working toward maximizing one's own 
rewards and minimizing one's costs (Burgess & Huston, 1979). In time, individuals begin to rely on social 
exchanges and the future benefits or opportunities. Participants operating within this type of exchange 
relationship focus on reciprocity and therefore operate under the norms of equivalence (Laursen & 
Hartup, 2002). In other sense, the beliefs individuals have about other people’s goals and intentions are 
important predictors of behavior in playing a game (Frey, et al., 2005). Individuals who attribute others’ 
actions to hostile intent tend to react with blame and anger when they are injured, compared to those who 
infer, benign intent (de Castro et al., 2002).  
In game playing, if it is required for players to mutual assistance directly that implies that there are 
repeated interactions between the same two individuals (or groups of individuals), and that both have 
resources that are attractive to one another (Trivers, 1971) such that both parties receive direct benefit 
from exchange (Hammerstein & Leimar, 2006), referred to as “conditional cooperation”. Frey and his 
colleagues (2005) proposed four categories that reflect behaviors of game participants during decision 
making: (1) dominating behavior: whereby players select self-high outcome to dominate other members 
in a team or pair; (2) individualistic behavior: whereby players select self-high outcome to gain the 
greatest advantage; (3) egalitarian behavior: whereby players select equal-high outcome but self-high 
outcome is second choice; and (4) altruistic behavior: whereby players select equal-high outcome but 
self-low or equal-low outcome are second choices. To the current research, the conceptualization of Frey 
and his colleagues (2005) in regard to game participants’ behavior types is adopted as the condition of 
game change. Then, the research question 1 can be postulated that “Will the players’ socially competent 
behavioral change when they are grouped to play a coop-competition game?”  
Gender difference in social behavior change 
Games vary in the ability of other players to reciprocate, the number of players, the number of iterations, 
the ability of outside observers to reward and punish selfish behavior, payoffs from cooperation versus 
defection, and the reputation of other players (for a review, see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). They also 
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differ in terms of stable individual differences of players, such as their age, sex, and culture (Henrich et 
al., 2005). By the elementary school years, boys spend considerably more time in coalitional activities 
than girls, and girls spend more time in dyadic activities, on average, than boys (Benenson et al., 1997). 
There is also an evidence to suggest that girls are more sensitive to any inequalities in their relationships 
and inequalities among females in general, both in terms of material resources and social status (Ahlgren 
& Johnson, 1979; Winstead, 1986). The pattern suggests that, in comparison to boys, girls show greater 
interpersonal engagement and knowledge about the significant other in dyadic relationships (Markovits et 
al., 2001). To be sure, there are evolutionary models of sex differences in social behavior (Geary et al., 
2003; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). Then, the research question 2 of this study can be postulated that “Is 
there any significant difference of behavior change between girls and boys in the game?”  
Research Design 
In a broader sense, game theory is pertinent to virtually every dynamic interaction between sentient 
beings (Wilson, 2006). Within this framework, several games have been developed to examine subjects’ 
behavior in cooperative scenarios, which differ in complexity according to the number of participants and 
repetitions of social exchange. In a dynamic game design, the game scenario should provide players to 
constantly evaluate and adjust the competition/collaboration strategies (Menasche, Figueiredo, & Silva, 
2005; Sigmund and Nowak, 1999), thereby engaging themselves in logical thinking (Menasche et al., 
2005). In order to answer the two research questions, this study employed an evolutionary game, named 
Strike up which is one type of educational game (Hong et al, 2009), to examine the social behavior 
change of the players. 
Game design 
Specifically, the developmental activities may enable girls and boys to form cohesive and competitive 
coalitions and thus work out in-group dominance relations (Geary et al., 2003) or with more series 
competition in game playing. In the present study, researchers developed an evolutionary computer based 
game, named Strike Up, a game played between two or many teams, with the game context and/or 
strategy changing every turn (Hong et al., 2009). In this game, six children were divided into two 
competing teams. The objective for each team is to move their flags from the start point to the end point 
(326 steps to the goal). The game interface is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Game interface details. 
As shown in Figure 2, the numbers of steps to be taken at each round is dependent on what was randomly 
drawn from the deck of virtual poker card shown on the screen. Five cards from 1 to 9 are retrieved by 
each player at each turn, and five card numbers can be used for counting the steps he or she can move The 
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five card numbers counting approach is limited to use +, ˉ, ×, ÷ once in a turn. In order to move forward 
to win the game, the players have to calculate out the maximum value or best value to step forward. 
Because punishing norm violators is often considered a stabilizing act that sustains long-term cooperation 
(Boyd & Richerson, 2002), it is considered designing a scheme consistent with social rationality. 10 J Q 
K cards are function cards perform support or set up functions. Children can use function cards to get 
bonus points or to ‘tackle back’ other opponents.  
 
Figure 2 Game interface while playing. 
The feature of this game design corresponds to Menasche and his colleagues’ (2005) principles, which 
includes: (1) Games are played among teams; (2) Player interaction continues as time elapses; (3) Players 
can choose from different game modes; (4) Player decisions are associated with valuable movements; and 
(5) Players adjust game strategies according to game dynamics. In other words, the research tool Strike 
Up enables players to interact with content, collaborate with peers, and benefit from player support 
(Northrup, 2001). As such, each cooperation-competition scenarios were scrutinized. 
Research participants 
This study includes six 5th grade elementary school students from a local elementary school in Taipei. 
They were divided into two teams. Three girls are in team A, they are labeled as A1, A2, and A3. The 
other three boys are in team B, they are labeled as B1, B2, and B3. The experiment was conducted after 
class hours. The participants played Strike Up as part of after class leisure activity.  
Data collection and analysis  
The contents of this game reflect the emphasis of on-line game. Then, the qualitative data can be carried 
out as exploratory work to identify themes for further exploration in a fuller study. Data analysis within 
interpretive methodology is complicated by the central assumptions analyzed by such researchers 
(Sandiford & Seymour, 2007). Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 9) suggested a variety of ‘analytic 
practices’ which could be summarized as: coding data, reflecting on data, sorting data, identifying 
patterns in data, moving towards generalizations and developing or testing theories/conceptualizing 
(Sandiford & Seymour, 2007). Then, the process of analysis involves different stages as follows: 1) 
Preparation of data for analysis, 2) Coding and display, 3) Data reduction: Refining ‘raw data’ into clear 
text, 4) Componential analysis: Developing interpretations and verification, 5) Theme analysis: 
Developing interpretations and verification, and 6) Conclusion drawing.  
Reliability has to do with the consistency or repeatability of assessments. Of the numerous types of 
reliability, estimating the internal consistency among items on an evaluation form and determining the 
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number of responses needed to achieve precise evaluation ratings (Greenwald, 1997). The triangulation 
method was employed to assess the reliability of the data, three investigators were there to supervise, 
videotape, and to take field notes. They read the data recorded from game playing by students to analyze 
and interpret the interactions among children. The reliability of data interpretation reached to .90 of this 
study.  
The Findings 
Since children on the same team have varied understanding and expectations for interdependency. 
Individuals’ coop-competition modes also differ. The observation was carried out for three rounds. Play 
sequence for one round constitute turn taking in the following order: A1-B1-A2-B2-A3-B3. Interactive 
dialogues in each round were classified into four types of social behaviors based on Frey et al. (2005) 
proposed theory.  
Dominating behavior in the game 
At the beginning of the game, the players with better arithmetic ability would figure out the value of the 
five number cards much sooner than those with lower arithmetic ability. Those players with better 
arithmetic ability would also spontaneously help those slow counting members and demonstrate some 
kind of dominating behavior.    
Situation 1: To determine who to start first, the game was started by a game of “scissor, paper, and 
stone”. It would be B1’s turn to play but B2 stood beside and try to monitor B1’s performance.  An 
excerpt of the conversation is as follows. 
B2 Ȑspeaks to B3ȑǺ”I hope you can draw out 9, 9, 9, and 9.” 
B2Ǻ”9, 9, 9, 1, 1… how wonderfulǼ” 
B2Ǻ”9×(9+9).” 
B3Ǻ”Divided by 1, then minus by 1.” 
B2Ǻ”No, it should be minus by 1 then divided by 1.” 
B2Ǻ”Listen to me, you will find out that the value will be the biggest.” 
B3Ǻ”No, I insist on divide before subtracting.” 
B2Ǻ”It is the same, either way is OK.” 
B3Ǻ”But I prefer subtraction followed by division.”(B2 tried to keep privilege) 
(13’25”~14’00”) 
B2’s math ability is somehow better than B1’s (according to the math tests). So, B2 have more confidence 
in counting and giving someone a hand. Then, it is observed that B2 is a dominating character who tries 
to enforce others to take his suggestions. The other type of dominating behavior occurred while 
approaching toward the end of the game Round 4).  
Situation 2: It was B3’s turn to play (The card numbers were 2,7,1,5,8.  B1 tried 2×˄7ˇ1ˉ5˅÷8, yet 
he was hesitant, then B2 and B1 give some suggestions to him.  
B3Ǻ”6 divides by 8 is equal to?” 
B1Ǻ”6 divides by 8 is equal to 6 out of 8.” 
B2Ǻ”No, the rules require us to round up, so the result is 0.” 
B3Ǻ”Is 0?”(B3 spoke in a doubtful sound.) 
B1Ǻ”1 is goodyǼ 
B2Ǻ”I count outǴ1 or 0.” (He stood up and insisted his results.) 
B3Ǻ”Well, the result is…”(Ask B1 to confirm B2’s results) 
B3Ȑspeaks to B2ȑǺ”I don’t want your help. I will count it by myself…” 
B1Ȑspeaks to B3ȑǺ”You can take B2’s idea. You can take B2’s idea.” 
B3Ȑspeaks to B2ȑǺ”No, I don’t want to listen to you.”(B1 used left hand to keep B2 away) 
B2Ȑspeaks to B3ȑǺ”OOXX” (Murmuring dirty words)  
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B3Ȑspeaks to B2ȑǺ”Go away or shut upǼ” 
B1Ȑspeaks to B2ȑǺ”He counts out 1. PerfectǼ” 
B2Ǻ”Really?” 
B3Ǻ”Yes, it is right.” 
B3Ǻ”So, I can work it out by myself and do better than others.”(Show that he is confident   by tapping 
his chest using right hand) 
(13’15”~14’35”) 
Denotation: People with a proself inclination are either self-maximizing or competitive and will only 
cooperate when it is in their self-interest to do so (Van Lange, 2000). People on Machiavellianism display 
a combination of selfishness and opportunism (e.g., Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1998). From the above 
discourse, B3 as dominator tends to cooperate less and their cooperative behavior is purely default. 
Individualistic behavior in the game  
Those players with better arithmetic ability and more ambition in winning the game will show that they 
only concerned about themselves in counting or using functional cards. 
Situation 1: It was B1’s turn in the secondary round. B1 was counting his five cards to figure out the 
maximum value or best value (go by short) and B2 drew another five cards to count (A3 will be next 
player). 
B1Ȑspeaks to B2ȑǺ”I have 6, 7,8,3,7, how to arrange for best movement.”(B1 tries to ask for B2’s 
assistance) 
B2Ǻ”6,7,8,3,7…..Very good. But, I have 6,2,5,7,6. I have to figure out the best value.” 
B1Ȑspeaks to B2ȑǺ”Please help me figure out this first, it is my turn to move.” 
B2Ǻ”Let me figure out mine, then I will count for you.” 
B1Ǻ”The scenario will be changed after this turn, the value you count out will be useless, please count 
mine first.” 
B2Ǻ”No, after I figure out mine, I will count for you.” 
B1Ǻ”You help me, then, I will help you.” 
B2Ǻ”I count out mine already, now I can help you.” 
 (18’25”~23’00”) 
Situation 2: B2 played his turn by figuring out the best value of five cards. After moving  his flag to that 
place which according to the calculation of the five card numbers, he drew the so called “function card” 
and got J card by which he can move forward 50 steps as bonus or give to one of his teammates to move 
forward 50 steps. Since B3 was lagging way behind and he wished that B2 could give him a hand. 
B3: “B2 please use that card for me, I am so far behind everybody else.” 
B2 (making an excuse): “I want that card for myself. Do not be worried; you will get a lucky card during 
your turn.” 
B3: “You should help me; otherwise we will lose the game.” 
B2: “Don’t worry; it is still very far from reaching the end. I would have helped you if I am close to the 
end.” 
B3: “… I might always be kicked back, then, it will be too late to rescue me later.”  
B2: “You are too noisy. I will wait for someone to give me a hand, and then I will help you.” 
(25’ 25” – 28’40”) 
 
In order to promote the playfulness in the mathematic game, the cooperation and competition are two 
very important elements. If the players only approach the game competitively, then it will be very 
difficult for all members to finish the game. In particular, at the very final stage, the exact value needs to 
be figured out for the rest steps to the goal, if there are the remaining values after subtracting the steps to 
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the goal, the player will move him or her further backward from where he or she started. Thus, players 
should realize that cooperation is important as the team needs to win the game together. 
Situation 3: As the game went on, most players were having their flags close to the end. This meant that 
the chance of being bumped back would be increased. In addition, the function card could be used to help 
others and/or hinder others. If team members were too individualistic, it would be difficult to finish the 
game. 
B2: “I got bumped back so many times; I stayed around the last part of the game for at least 10 minutes.” 
B3: “You deserved it.” 
B1: “B2 you should help B3 at the beginning of the game.” 
B2: “OK. I know I was wrong.”  
(14’00”-14’10”) 
Denotation: Individualisms showed that their social strategies are more calculative and adapted to the 
situation at hand. It is not unlikely that behavior should predominate among individuals with other-
regarding preferences (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008; Gintis et al., 2003). In line with this, the above 
discourse indicated that B2cooperation in a social dilemma was more likely to proself before he can help 
others. B2’s willingness to cooperate in one-shot social dilemmas has further been related to 
individualism in stable personality traits. 
Egalitarian behavior in the game 
At the beginning of the game, opposing teams sought possible assistance by exchanging benefits. 
However, it was uncertain if the other members could be trusted. Exploratory talks were frequently 
conducted to test each other and to determine whether the other team could be trusted. Mutual 
improvements were pursued throughout the process with optimistic attitude. 
Situation 1: A1 believed that the game was just a game.  She did not take it too serious but still tried to 
seek reciprocally help. At the beginning of game, she ever gave some benefits to B2. It was interesting 
that one of her teammates (A2) tried to compete to hurt one of opposite teammates, so when A1 got a 
number, she can decide t to bump back B2 or recalculate out other number to move forward, A2 asked her 
to take the first action to bump back B2. 
A2:  “Try to bump back B2.” 
A1Ǻ “Never mind, I will give way to B2, he will repay me later!” 
B2Ǻ “A2 (Calling her by the name) I will revenge, watch out!” 
A1Ǻ “Just remember to add 90 steps for me!” 
B2Ǻ “No way, your friend did this to you, blame her.” 
B1Ǻ “If we get a King, we will set her (A2) up” 
…… 
A1Ǻ “Your thoughts are evil!”      
B1Ǻ “You call me evil! B2 is worse than me!” 
A1Ǻ “But I just descended him and revenged!”  
It is the turn of B2 to draw the function card, and he got the King card.  
B2Ǻ “K, according to the rules of this game, I will move A2 50 steps backward.” 
A2Ǻ “Please help me, don’ hurt me. You can use it to help your teammate B1”    
B2Ǻ “Ok. I will let you know what revenge is” (B2 set A2 to move backward 50 steps) 
(39’40~43’30) 
By Round 3, there were more descend short-cut close to the target. The possibility of setting up rivals 
using function cards increased. The desire for the children to win resulted in attitude inconsistencies and 
conflicts. Different strategies to handle conflicts reflected the individuals’ varied characteristics. It was 
even possible for the members to alter individual social behaviors in order to solve the conflicts.    
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Situation 2: In the scenario below, A1 and B1 insisted on keeping promises (Egalitarian) at the beginning 
of the game. However since B3 wished to win, his attitude was more individualistic at this stage. A1 was 
displeased and B1 tried to change the mind of his teammate. In the process, B3 altered his social behavior.   
B3Ǻ “J, according to the rules of this game, I got J, I can assign one opponent to the nearest ladder 
to go up or descend.” (B3 assigned A1 to descend.ȑ 
B1Ǻ “Really?” (His teammate was surprised in B3’s decision) 
B3Ǻ“Why not?”  
B1Ǻ“Didn’t A1 just descend a while ago?” 
B3Ǻ “Why can’t she (A1) be moved down again?  
A1Ǻ “Why did you descend me again?” 
B3Ǻ “Why should I be nice to you? You’d better go down from here.” 
B2Ǻ “Oh, let them both go down, so I can get rid of them both!” 
A1Ǻ “B3, you shouldn’t do that.”    
B3Ǻ “I’d do anything to win, so I don’t really want you to go up.” 
A1Ǻ “All right then, you owe me 3 square magnets! It’s unfair! You broke your promise! You will 
be condemned by God!” 
B3Ǻ “I honestly want A2 to descend some more, but I can’t.” (A2 is closed to the end) 
A1Ǻ “Never mind just let her go up. It gets harder the closer she gets.” (The rule of this game 
require the players to find the right numbers to step forward to the end, otherwise, the players 
have to move backward based on the rest of numbers deducing from the forward steps) 
B3Ǻ “Ok! I will let A2 go up.”Ƕ 
(Meanwhile, B1 interrupted their conversation and ask B3 to help A1) 
B1: “Look! B3 let you go up!” 
A1Ǻ “Ok, then. We are even B3! 
( 53’15”~55’50”) 
Denotation: Not surprisingly, the term “strong reciprocator,” commonly used by Egalitarian, refers to 
those individuals that are inclined to both cooperate in one-shot interactions, and support those who do 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). From the above discourse, the study indicated that A1is a strong reciprocator 
even willing to help a defector when they themselves were merely the opposite party of a fair interaction. 
Altruistic behavior in the game  
In a game, not all people share common interests and help one another strategically. In a group, there are 
those who do not expect returns. After multiple “gives”, a positive stimulus is produced within the group. 
Subsequent mutual help and teamwork attitude are then produced. Based on observed records, A2 is the 
altruist. The dialogue below shows how she repeatedly assisted her teammates in conducting 
computations:  
Situation 1: At the game, basically, no body can use calculator to count his or her number cards. Not 
every participant is good at arithmetic. Those who did better at math would need to wait longer for his or 
her turn and might feel impatient. As such, it was observed that effort was made to help those who were 
poor at arithmetic, even for the opponents.  
A3: “B3, what cards have you got?”  
B3: “8, 9, 3, 8, 1…”               
A3: “let me count, 8, 9, 3, 8, 1…” 
B2: You can’t calculate for the opponents.”          
A3: “Yes, I can.” 
(73’23”- 75’15”) 
Toward the last part of the dialogue during the game, A3 actively helped others but was not dominating. 
She sought the greatest benefits by calculating on behalf of others.    
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Situation 2: Also, A2 displayed “self-sacrifice” characteristics in the group. She sacrificed herself to 
achieve greater good for the group. It is A1’s turn, A2 asked others to descend her as shown in the 
dialogue below:   
A1Ǻ “Let’s calculate together (referring to A3), and see who’s better.” 
B3Ǻ “You can’t help her calculate!” 
A2Ǻ “Let’s compare if the equation she just wrote is better than mine.”    
Ȑ76’20”~76’53”ȑ 
A2Ǻ “I descended the least, descend me please.” (She tried to work out the most possible ways to get 
the end for other teammates) 
A1Ǻ “Why do we descend all the time in the game”? (She seemed to ask all players to give helps to 
opponents instead of giving hurt) 
Ȑ77’00”~77’10”ȑ 
Toward the end of the game, A2 and A3 even helped their opponents compute. The mutual help mode not 
only applied among teammates but also between opposing teams. 
Situation 3: At the final stage, if players choose not to use negative strategy, due to it was likely that all 
members of the team would be descended. Then, it would be difficult to get to the end. 
A3Ǻ “B3, my calculations turn out to be 16.” 
A2Ǻ “16 means B3 has to go back a long way, 12 steps will be better.” 
A3Ǻ “B3 wait a moment, I re-calculate and come up to 10, take a look for you!” 
Ȑ90’05”~90’30”ȑ 
Denotation: After being treated fairly and unfairly in a cooperative/competitive game, altruistic express 
cooperative emotions more frequently than do dominators or individuals (Schug et al., 2010). From the 
above discourse, that is, by expressing help emotions in the game playing, A2 and A3 are altruistic 
cooperators reveal their honest motivational intentions which serve to attract potential interaction partners 
and deter defection.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Social behavior changes refer to the phenomena that people seem to care about certain “social” goals, 
such as a “fair” allocation among members in society, in addition to their own material benefits (Li, 
2008).  
To answer the first research question: “Will the players’ socially competent behavioral change when they 
are grouped to play a coop-competition game?” The results of this study showed that at the beginning, 
individualistic behavior displayed frequently in the boys’ team and dominating behavior was displayed at 
the final stage in the boys’ team. Evidence of ‘conditional cooperation’ is identified: when students 
expect others to contribute, they themselves tend to donate more (Frey & Meier, 2004). In the 
manifestations of children’s game behavior, the interaction frequency increases as they get closer to the 
target, their altruistic behavior appeared at the final competitive stage in female team. The Strike Up 
game involved activities in creating coalitions and dominance result in many of the social behaviors of 
boys that are sometimes viewed unfavorably, this result is agreed to the study of Geary et al. (2003) 
which indicates that boy are more serious to win then their proself behavior is displayed at the beginning 
stage of competition, because they do not want to be the suckers (Croson, 2007; Gachter et al., 2003) 
To answer the second research question: “Is there any significant difference of behavior change between 
girls and boys in the game?” It is observed that the numbered cards utilized in Strike Up help promote 
arithmetic competence of children. Function card use also helps enhance interactions between teams. The 
function cards in the game design can be used to help or to set up opponents. At the beginning of the 
game, girls mostly interacted in egalitarian mode, or chose to be outsiders. When competition grew 
fiercer at the end of the game, children changed from egalitarian to individualistic or altruistic. If an 
altruist is present in a group such as A2, there will be mutual help between groups, and harmony can be 
maintained. The results are agreed to the studies of Geary et al. (2003) and Trivers (1971) which state that   
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among the proximate mechanisms of cooperation, if they feel guilt for a failure to reciprocate, they will 
monitor the give-and-take of the relationship and maintain the cooperation. In comparison to girls, the 
relationships of boys are predicted to be and are more readily maintainable (Whitesell & Harter, 1996).  
In conclusion, this study found that that apart from a few unconditional cooperators (“altruists”), most 5th 
grade male students are only willing to cooperate when they expect others to cooperate as well. The most 
powerful support for the importance of social norms for altruistic behavior directed towards genetically 
unrelated individuals stems from studies of strong reciprocity. Consequently, people who contribute 
apparently trust the others after several runs in this game. These results of this study may imply grouping 
system for allocating different characters of students in the game of Strike up to promote the awareness of 
prosocial behavior and maintain the behavioral intention more stable.  
Limitation and Future study 
This study has been conducted in qualitative method, the case analysis was employed which might not be 
enough to predict all other cooperative and competitive contest settings, and the quantitative method 
should further be applied to analyze the research data to imply the better grouping for students to have 
behavior change.  
Social information processing models can be used to explain the development and maintenance of 
prosocial behavior (Nelson & Crick, 1999). More precisely, relationships based on reciprocal altruism 
should result in the evolution of proximate social and emotional mechanisms that function to ensure 
equality of the benefits received from the relationship. This model would be examined in relation to the 
development of behavioral intention, future study may place at examining the relation between prosocial 
behaviors and the evolutionary change of 4 types of game behavior in a coop-competitive game. 
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